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Reporting at the Enterprise Level
As WE have seen, the Soviet enterprise is both the producer of in-
dustrial goods and the originator of the statistical information on
their output. This infonnation simultaneously provides the basis
for national statistics of industrial output, indicates the degree of
fulfillment of past plans, serves as evidence of the quality of per-
formance of the producer (be it the enterprise as a whole or the
individual worker), and throws light on the functioning of the enter-
prise (or its personnel) in its capacity as the guardian and trustee
of state property. In other words, what, from the over-all economic
and administrative standpoints, constitutes a centripetal flow of in-
formation that is vital to the continuous planning and central man-
agement of the command economy, appears, to those directly in-
volved in production, as a process of self-rating by subordinates
before their administrative superiors. Moreover, the rewards for
good performance are high; the penalties for poor performance are
often severe. It is therefore hardly surprising that the most signifi-
cant distortion of output data—disregarding, for the present, distor-
tion at publication—apparently takes place at the level of the pro-
ducing enterprise.
Since the enterprise reports by entering figures in the appropriate
spaces of minutely prescribed forms, this distortion may be assumed
to be virtually entirely of the numerical rather than the descriptive
variety. (For the same reason, all distortion within the routine
channels of data flow, all the way to the peak within TsSU, may be
regarded as chiefly numerical. Descriptive distortion becomes sig-
nificant only where there is considerable latitude in the mode of
data presentation, e.g. in the sporadic publication of statistics.) It
must be noted at the outset that numerical distortion may be in
either direction. Insofar as the information reported to higher levels
(either above the enterprise or still within it) determines the re-
wards and punishments dispensed to the managerial and operating
personnel as producers—that is to say, as fuffillers of quantitative
production targets, there is a strong incentive to embellish the situa-
tion by "writing up" production data. This is what Berliner, in his
admirable study of Soviet managerial behavior, calls "simulation
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[of plan fulfillment] by falsification of and what Tsonev,
in his paper on Soviet statistics, calls "reverse falsification" (vstrech-
naia fal'sifikatsiia) by analogy with "reverse planning" (i.e. planning
from below) •2Butat times the greater gain for the personnel of the
enterprise may lie outside official channels, for example in pilferage
or illicit sale of the product. In such cases the rational course of
action may be to understate output in the statistical and accounting
reports, so as to conceal the diversion of some of the product into
unauthorized channels. Both tendencies, toward write-ups and
write-downs, are well kiiown to the regime.
The effective limits to distortion are set by the personal risks
entailed by it, or the activity that prompts it (such as pilferage), for
the one who distorts statistical data. However, the intensity of the
incentives to distort and the risks incurred thereby may vary from
one branch of industry to another. They may also vary over time, so
that the actual degree of distortion of output statistics in any given
branch, and even its very direction, may fluctuate over the years.
Because the motives behind write-ups and write-downs, their
"technical" sides, and their limits are largely distinct, they are dis-
cussed in separate sections of this chapter, with special attention in
each instance to (1) motives and (2) methods or techniques in-
volved in distorting output data. The last section discusses the limits
to distortion in the enterprise.
Write-Ups by the Worker3
The prevalence of incentive pay in Soviet industry is well known.
The percentage of working time or workers in large-scale industry
paid on a piece-rate basis exceeded one half of the total as early as
1928, and has risen since then as the following tabulation shows
1.JosephS. Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR, Cambridge, Mass.,
1957, Chapter x.
2V.Tsonev, "FalsificationofSoviet IndustrialStatistics"(unpublished
manuscript for Research Program on the USSR), New York, 1953, p. 7.
3By I mean anyone who both produces and reports output to the
management of the enterprise; the term therefore subsumes foremen and other
junior supervisory personnel.
4Figuresfor 1928-1935 refer to man-hours worked over the years in ques-
tion; those for 1938-1955 to the number of workers in that year (for 1936-
1938—at or near the end of the year). The figures for 1940 and 1955 pertain
to all industry.
Sources:1928-1935—Sot.sialisticheskoe S SS R tSocialist Con-
struction in the USSRJ, Moscow, 1936, p. 526; 1936-1938, 1940—E. L. Mane-
vich, Zarabotnaia plata i ee formy v prom yshlenriosti SSSR [Wages and Their






It may be assumed that the percentages are even higher for those
workers who have any output to report, i.e. those engaged in direct
production as opposed to those performing auxiliary operations
(janitors, guards, quality inspectors, etc.), the latter typically be-
ing paid on a time basis. In the later thirties, over 40 per cent of
piece-rate workers were on "progressive piece frequently
with sharply graduated rates for above-norm output.
Apparently some of the most sharply graduated piece rates are
found in the coal miiiing industry, where nearly half of aU workers
were on progressive piece rates before the war° (and probably still
are). Here, certain "leading" underground jobs were paid as fol-
lows: 80 to 100 per cent fulfillment of the basic work norm—double
the base piece rate, everything over 100 per cent fulfillment—triple
the base piece rate.7
Some piece-rate workers also receive premiums for above-norm
performance in respects other than sheer quantity of output. Thus,
they may directly benefit from the economical use of raw materials,
power, fuel, equipment, and other inputs, or from meeting and sur-
pas sing certain minimum quality requisites of output. Input econ-
omy is typically expressed as the difference between the norm of
input per unit of output and the actual ratio achieved by the worker.
It is clear that, ceteris paribus, the higher the output that is credited
to the worker, the better his apparent record of input utilization.8
To summarize, the Soviet industrial worker may have the follow-
ing motives for writing up his actual output or for exaggerating its
quality:
1. To earn more on a piece-rate basis, and especially on the pro-
gressive piece-rate basis.
2. To earn higher premiums for economizing on the use of one or
more inputs.
FormsinUSSR Industryl, Moscow, 1951,pp. 80, 82; 1955—V.E.,1955, No. 8,
p.7.
Manevich, op.cit., p. 82.
6Ibid.
7ibid.,p. 143; A. A. Zvorykin et al., Ekonoinika ugol'noi prom qshlennosti
SSSR [Economics of the USSR Coal Industry], 2nd ed., Moscow, 1954, p. 180.
8Manevich,op.cit., pp. 153-160.
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3. To receive a share of the saving in money unit cost of produc-
tion, as may be provided in certain cases.
4. To earn premiums for quality of production.
5. To be eligible for higher rations when these are tied to per-
formance, as during periods of consumer rationing or in corrective
labor camps.
6. To receive the material or intangible benefits that are accorded
to the "better" workers, such as housing, vacations, honorable men-
tion, etc.
7. To justify a higher than necessary allocation of inputs for his
use in order to dispose of them illicitly and to his personal profit.
The writing up of the physical output of individual workers, or
of teams of workers, in order to raise their earnings seems to be
widespread in the Soviet economy, including the industrial sector.9
The relevant question here, however, is not how widespread such
write-ups are, or how large they are on the whole, but to what extent
they affect the industrial firm's accounting (and therefore reporting)
of finished output. It would seem that in the latter respect the sig-
nificance of write-ups by (and for) workers is perhaps smaller than
their ubiquity might indicate for two reasons:
1. The recording of finished output is usually a more complicated
operation, involving quality inspection (OTK) and formal accept-
ance by the warehouse, than the recording of the output of inter-
mediate components and parts, not to mention the recording of
operations which leave little if any measurable evidence of the
product.
2. Much of the writing up of workers' output is done with the
connivance (and often cooperation) of the supervisory personnel
which, however, for its own protection, tends to channel such write-
ups toward jobs that leave little or no tangible evidence of the
actual amount of work performed by the worker.1° These are, of
°Cf.Berliner, op.cit., pp. 172-174. There is also considerable evidence of the
prevalence of this practice—tufta in Russian slang—in the forced labor camps,
although the especially harsh conditions may make it more of a necessity
there. See, for example, the vivid description in Susanne Leonhard (Cestoh-
lenes Leben, Frankfurt,1958,pp.613-615), who quotes the prisoners'
philosophy: "with blat [illicit deals, "pull"] and tufta one can take it for ten
years."
10Berliner,op.cit., pp. 173-174. For similar reasons, the construction indus-
try may be the worst offender in the Soviet economy when it comes to the
exaggeration of volume of finished output on the basis of write-ups by (and
for) individual workers. Here, jobs are frequently unstandardized, checking the
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course, generally auxiliary and intermediate jobs, rather than the
production of finished output.
Write-ups by the worker are hardest to effect in continuous flow
production, and therefore they are significant in job lot or batch
production. This is recognized in a Soviet book on auditing." In lot
or batch production the foreman, who attests the work performed
by signing the work order, is frequently no less interested in exag-
gerating output than the worker himself. Some sources consider the
storekeeper, to whom the completed semifinished or finished items
are turned over, to be a significant obstacle to write-ups by workers
because he is financially responsible for the inventory under his
jurisdiction. Thus the same textbook on auditing states: "The output
indicated in the work order may be regarded to be unquestionably
valid when it is entered by a financially responsible person in the
intermediate storeroom or warehouse where such parts are accepted
by tale, weight, or measure." And adds: "However, production con-
ditions do not permit such intermediate storerooms to be organized
everywhere."12
the amount of work done by the individual worker is often difficult after the
fact, and the total volume of output by the construction enterprise is apparently
often arrived at by merely summing the individual workers' contribution. For
instance, an audit of work orders in construction organizations conducted in
Moscow in 1951 revealed overpayment of wages on the basis of write-ups of
25 per cent on the average (V.E., 1955, No. 8, p. 53). An audit by physical
measurement conducted in the Bashkir ASSR in 1955 found that the volume
of reported construction work had been exaggerated by over 25 per cent
(ibid.). Similarly, it was found in 1952-1953 that the mechanized equipment
pools of the Ministry of Construction had been writing up the volume of
excavation work by as much as 30 to 40 per cent. "By 1954 [these] write-ups
had diminished sharply, but were far from eliminated" (Finansy SSSR, 1955,
No. 7, p. 47). Write-ups of construction work of 19 per cent are reported in
another case (P.Zh., 1955, No.P. 28).
These practices continue. Writing in Finansy SSSR (1957, No. 7, pp. 35-37),
the head of the Kirgiz branch of the Prombank (i.e. the Industrial Bank, which
is charged with financing and supervising investment in industry and related
branches of the economy) complains that physical audits within his jurisdiction
have revealed numerous cases of writing up in construction, in one instance
to the extent of 41 per cent of the claimed amount of work; that the agencies
of the Procuracy, though charged with initiating formal prosecution against
guilty parties when evidence of write-up is presented to them by the Bank,
have hardly ever "in our experience" in the Kirgiz SSSR done so; and that
consequently "in 1956, the number of instances of write-up not only did not
diminish in comparison with 1955, but actually increased."
11D.I. Alenchikov, i tekhnika dokum.ental'noi revizii [Organ-
ization and Method of Documents Audit), 4th ed,, Moscow, 1954, pp. 129f.
12Ibid.,p. 130.
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A recent article discussing a specific case in the tractor industry
suggested that the recording of parts production can be rendered
accurate by turning this function over to the intermediate storeroom
as well as to the shop at the next stage of production.'3 Similarly, a
prewar article on related problems in the machine-building industry
urged the establishment of records at intermediate points in the
production process (pooperativnyi uchet) in order to minimize
write-ups and other abuses, which were conceded to be prevalent
at the time.14 None of the sources just mentioned is concerned with
the recording of finished output. Moreover, we shall see later in this
chapter that the storekeepers do not represent an insuperable
barrier to write-ups.
In general, write-ups by workers (and by management) seem to
be greatly facilitated by the primitiveness of measuring, counting,
and weighing devices. Tsonev recounts from his experience a strik-
ing example of primitive recording in the coal mining industry, ren-
dered grotesque by the fact that the clerk was paid a piece rate for
the amount of coal He also reports instances of inten-
tional sabotage of automatic measuring devices,'6 a phenomenon
that finds corroboration in the Soviet press.17
Write-Ups bg Management
The problems and operating principles of Soviet management have
been carefully studied by Western economists;'8 little purpose
would be served in reproducing their findings here. Suffice it to
mention that they generally agree, diverging only in detail and
emphasis, that, in view of the structure of incentives, the behavior
of Soviet management is directed toward the fulfillment and over-
fulfillment of the output goal, and, to a smaller extent, toward suc-
cessful performance according to a series of other quantitative and
qualitative indicators. The enterprise's output goal for a given pe-
riod is usually a value figure, which in turn is the sum of the prod-
13 Avtomobil'naia i traktornaia promyshlennost', 1955, No. 7,p. 1.
1939, No. 12, pp. 124f.
'5 Tsonev, op.cit., pp. 102f.
ie Ibid., pp. lOef.
U Cf. Z.I., May 14, 1937,P. 3; this example pertains to the Rostov Agri-
cultural Machinery Plant, one of the "leading" industrial enterprises in the
country. See also Berliner, op.cit., p. 139.
18 See, especially, Berliner (op.cit.); Gregory Bienstock et at., Management
in Industry and Agriculture (Ithaca, 1948); and David Granick, Man-
agement of the Industrial Firm in the USSR (New York, 1954).
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ucts of physical output quotas and fixed prices. But the physical
output targets may be major goals in themselves, too.
The fulfillment and overfulfihiment of production plans bring
very large money premiums and other important benefits, material
and intangible, to the successful management.19 Clearly these re-
wards can be reaped (and failure avoided) by simulated as well as
by actual success. Both the physical output record and the unit price
may of course be manipulated or falsified to give the appearance of
plan fulfillment or overfulfihlment.20 The reported physical output
figures occupy a crucial position in management's thinking, not only
for the reasons just cited, but also because they affect success in
terms of a number of other indicators. The higher the reported
physical output figures, the better the management's record looks
on the following counts, all or nearly all of which may determine
the material and intangible benefits for the executive personnel of
the firm: (1) attainment and overfulfihiment of the production plan;
(2) attainment of the assortment plan; (3) unit money cost of pro-
duction; (4) utilization of inputs (labor, materials, fuel, equipment,
etc.) per unit of output; and possibly (5) realization of profits, total
and per unit of output.2' In addition, the higher the reported out-
put, the easier it is for management to: (6) obtain the allocation of
rationed materials; (7) obtain cash for wage payment; (8) obtain
bank credit; (9) conceal sales of output at above-legal prices; (10)
conceal diversion of inputs to illicit uses; (11) conceal overpayment
of wages and overexpenditure on other inputs; and (12) avoid the
unwelcome attention that unsatisfactory performance on points (1)
through (5) above might invite.
19 On the importance of these benefits, and especially on the size of the
premiums, see Berliner, op.cit., Chapter in.
20 Intentional raising of the so-called constant prices at which the reported
output is valued may, in some respects, provide even greater opportunities for
management to present the appearance of success. Unlike the exaggeration of
physical output, the raising of the so-called constant prices is not subject to
anost of the checks discussed in this chapter, and its benefits last beyond the
given accounting period. An instance of such price manipulation is reported in
V.S.,1951,No. 5, p. 59. Apparently a favorite device of raising the so-called
constant prices is to pretend that a new product has replaced an old one (cf.
A. Nove, "'1926/27' and All That," Soviet Studies, October 1957, p. 121).
Other advantages that accrue to the enterprise from reclassifying an old
product as a new one are discussed in Berliner, op.cit., p. 158.
21 On the last point, it would appear at first glance that the realization of
higher profits depends on actual and not simulated increases in output, but
thanks to the ingenuity of Soviet accountants and the sellers' market, this is not
necessarily so. See, for instance, the reference to higher profits due to write-ups
in Finan.sy SSSR, 1955, No. 7, p. 47.
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The incentive for management to write up output in its periodic
reports must, therefore, be very strong, and that management does
so respond, though to varying degrees and in diverse ways, cannot
be doubted by anyone familiar with the relevant literature. We have
already noted in the preceding chapter that the frequent references
to write-ups in the speeches and articles of the statistical authorities,
the exhortations from above to be honest and to abide by "princi-
ples," the periodic announcement of penalties for distortion of re-
ported data, and so forth. A great amount of anecdotal material on
write-ups and similar acts of deception is scattered through the
Soviet press; it is extensively supplemented by the eyewitness ac-
counts of former residents of the USSR.22
There are many ways in which the physical output of a given
enterprise in a given period of time may be overstated, but not all
of them are of equal significance for our purpose. It will be recalled
that by Soviet definition "finished output" is supposed to meet cer-
tain specific quality standards, to be accepted by quality inspectors
(OTK), and to be turned over to the warehouse by midnight of the
last day of the period. The OTK inspectors are also frequently called
upon to determine the quality grade of the product. Such rigor in
statistical definition of finished output is, of course, necessitated by,
among other reasons, the system of planning and the existence of a
command economy, and especially the dispensation of rewards and
punishments for plan fulfillment. Rigor in quality specifications laid
down by the central authorities is also necessary because some of the
forces that tend to maintain or even raise quality standards in other
economies—competition amongsellersorthe"countervailing
power" of the buyers—are typically of little consequence in the
Soviet sellers' market. (By this I do not mean to imply that main-
tenance of quality standards, in the broadest sense of the phrase, is
not a problem in market economies. As we well know, it is. Nor do
I mean to suggest that some of the permissive causes of poor quality
of goods in market economies—such as consumer ignorance—do not
operate in command economies. They do.)
In his able survey and analysis of "simulation" of plan fulfillment
by Soviet management, Berliner distinguishes between deviation
from the assortment plan, deterioration of quality of output, and
falsification of reports (which approximately is what I have called
22Sucheyewitness accounts can be found in Tsonev, op.cit., passim, and
Berliner, op.cit., Chapters vm-x.
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"numerical distortion")Itis with numerical distortion that I shall
be concerned in the remainder of this section, postponing the dis-
cussion of the quality of reported output and of the composition of
heterogeneous commodities for the next section of this chapter. Two
qualifications should be noted at this point, however. First, while
deviation from the assortment plan may be of great importance for
the operation of the Soviet economy, for our purpose it is not im-
portant as long as the various commodities of the assortment are
planned and accurately reported as separate commodities. Thus if
an enterprise is ordered to produce in a given period x trucks and
y passenger cars, but in fact produces x + v and y —wunits, re-
spectively, and so reports its output, no statistical distortion need
be involved. On the other hand, if the enterprise reports the output
of a commodity that is recognized as a single item in its plan, but
which in fact is heterogeneous, as most commodities are, the ques-
tion of assortment within this commodity category becomes sig-
riificant for our purpose. This question will be taken up in the next
section. Secondly, considerations of quality cannot be dismissed
even in a discussion of "straight" numerical distortion, because there
is a point in the definition of finished output at which "quality be-
comes quantity." That is to say, if the quality of an article fails to
meet certain minimum commonly accepted or officially laid down
specifications, that article should not be included as part of finished
output. Its inclusion may be fairly regarded as a case of numerical
distortion; At the same time, as we shall see, the production and
outshipment of substandard or defective products—the so-called
bra/c—is an ever-present and serious problem in Soviet industry.
Turning to numerical distortion as such, as to be expected, the
techniques that leave little or no lasting record of illegal action are
among the most favored. These techniques are primarily (1) "bor-
rowing" output from the first few hours or days of the next period
and reporting it as the given period's production, and (2) exaggerat-
ing the value of goods in process, where changes in the inventory
of such goods enter into "gross value of output." The latter device,
however, does not seem to affect Soviet statistics of physical output,
since it pertains to intermediate stages of production rather than to
finished products, and to value rather than physical magnitude.24
23Berliner,op.cit., Chapters vm-x. Although Berliner's data refer primarily
to the thirties, there seems to have been little fundamental change in this regard
(cf. P.Kh., 1956, No. 1, p. 65).
24commonlyemployed method of quickly and painlessly increasing the
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Though the practice is undoubtedly extremely widespread,25 it is
difficult to say whether "borrowing" from the future appreciably
affects Soviet physical output statistics for a significant number of
commodities, even for individual years. Some of the complaints in
the literature on this score involve (at least for our purposes, if not
from the standpoint of the harassed manager) rather trivial dipping
into the future, for instance, to the extent of one shift.2° Other cases
reported are less trivial, though perhaps not very typical, as the
case of a Moscow plant which "borrowed" five to ten days each
month, for example.27 This looks like an instance of not being able
to get out of "debt," and in the months for which the "indebtedness"
changes' very little, there is also very little effect on the reliability of
the reported statistics. Extreme individual instances apart, there
would seem to be a limit to the inflation of this type of "debt." I am,
therefore, inclined to conclude that the "borrowing" technique is
more important as a means of smoothing out, in a minor way, the
apparent time curve of industrial output rather than as a way of
distorting the larger and longer-run output picture.
More serious distortion of output statistics may be provided by a
variant of the "borrowing" technique found in machine-building,
namely, the inclusion of items whose assembly is to be completed
after the end of the given period.28 Judging by the number of com-
plaints in the Soviet press, such items are frequently never com-
pletely assembled before shipment to the buyer. This practice can,
of course, also be regarded as cheating on the quality of output, or
the shipping out of brak.
Of greater interest to us are those distortions that constitute a
net write-up, rather than a mere redistribution of the output pattern
over time. Berliner's informants tended to belittle the incidence of
sheer invention of production figures by management as being too
risky. Yet one comes across such cases from time to time in the
Soviet press: e.g. in oil extraction,29 timber cutting and hauling
(where the reported figure was triple the actual one) ,30 and coal
valueofoutput before the books for the period are closed is to shift materials
from the storeroom to the production floor. This immediately transforms them
into "goods in process," and thus augments the enterprise s "gross value of
output" for the period.
25 Cf. Berliner, op.cit., pp. 161ff.
26 V.S., 1956, No. 1, p. 60.
27 Alenchikov, op.cit., p. 49. 28 V.S., 1951, No. 5,p. 59.
29 Aienchikov, op.cit., p. 50. V.S., 1955, No. 6, p. 11.
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mining.8' That such sheer invention is a significant problem is also
hinted at in the statements of the statistical authorities.32
A safer and clearly very widespread method of writing up output
is the inclusion of brak in the reported amount of finished product.
Direct references in the Soviet press, eyewitness testimony, and the
continual complaints about the substandard quality of industrial
products bear such ample and conclusive evidence of the prevalence
of this practice in Soviet industry, despite severe criminal and ad-
ministrative sanctions against it, that it is not necessary to dwell on
it further at this The general problem of quality is taken up
in the next section, while in the last section of this chapter, I shall
discuss how the enterprise can "get away with" reporting and ship-
ping out brak. (I assume that any brak shipped out to the customer
was naturally also recorded and reported as finished output.) How-
ever, there seems to be a loophole for the producer in reporting brak
as finished output, which is worth mentioning at this point. Brak that
has been discovered as such and returned by the buyer to the
producer need not be deducted from the producer's recorded (and
reported) output unless discovered before the end of the accounting
year during which it was Considering the typical bunch-
ing of shipments toward the end of the accounting year and the
"red tape" that prevails in interfirm relations, this loophole may be
of appreciable practical significance.
There are, of course, other methods of writing up output (e.g.
the presentation of old inventory as newly produced goods35) which
31Z.I.,June 1, 1936.
82E.g.the editorial in Vestnik statistiki which complains of inclusion "in
plan reports of output that has not been actually produced" (1952,
No. 4, p. 13).
33Cf.Berliner, op.cit., Chapter ix, where the problem of brak receives care-
ful attention.
S. A. Shchenkov, Otchetnost' promyshlennykh predpriiatii [Reporting by
Industrial Enterprises], Moscow, 1952, p. 37. "Cf.Z.l., Nov. 16, 1936; a similar case is related from personal experience
by Victor Kravchenko (I Chose Freedom, New York, 1952, P. 299).
A peculiar but apparently not unique case of writing up was recently re-
ported in some detail by Pravda (April 8,1959, p. 2). A creamery in
Khodorov, Drogobych oblast', colluded with a number of villages to purchase
butter from them instead of milk, which was credited to the villages against
their milk sales quotas. The butter was purchased by the village authorities
in the stores of nearby towns, and in turn was as its own output by
the creamery. To this extent the butter, of course, entered Soviet production
statistics twice. In the preceding year, according to the article, the director
of the creamery bought the butter himself in order to fulfil his milk purchas-
ing quota, entering it on the books as receipts of milk. The local (raion)
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amount to a net exaggeration of production over time, and only a
skilled Soviet practitioner of the art could compile a reasonably
complete catalogue of such techniques.
Devaluation of the Physical Unit of Measure
Because its fortunes depend primarily on fullhhing and overfulfiuing
the production plan in physical terms, or in value terms derived
directly from physical output, the management of the Soviet indus-
trial enterprise is strongly motivated to stress sheer quantity of
output at the expense of other considerations, such as quality. Cost
targets and input-utilization norms have the same effect. The
physical unit of measure in question here is, of course, the one that
is specified in the enterprise's plan and in terms of which its per-
formance is appraised by superior agencies. Let us call this unit
the "specified physical unit of measure." Given the system of plan-
ning and the structure of rewards, the Soviet industrial enterprise
has been discovered as such and returned by the buyer to the
physical unit of the product. And since we may assume a high
positive correlation between the effort by the producer and the
utility of the product to the user (consumer), there is therefore a
built-in tendency toward devaluation of the specified physical unit
of measure, that is, a tendency for the specified physical unit to
represent less use-value (intrinsic value, utility)Naturallythere
Party authorities tried to cover up the fraud when its exposure was threatened,
passing a resolution which categorically denied the existence of any machina-
tions in the procurement of agricultural produce in the villages or at the
creamery. Pravda, however, alleged that writing up is widely resorted to in the
agricultural reports in the Khodorov raion,andhinted that the same may be
going on in the other of the oblast'. On April 20, 1059, Pravda carried
a brief follow-up notice which stated that the director of the creamery was
reprimanded and discharged from the job, and the first secretary of the raion
Party committee was relieved of his post (but not discharged from the Party).
Nothing was said about any sanctions against the implicated village authori-
ties. A rather similar case of purchase of butter by a creamery in order
to meet itsproduction plan, but thistime with financialcontributions
toward the undertaking on the part of certain officials in the raion, was re-
ported in Krokodil, 1959, No. 1, p. 7. It seems likely that these events are in
some way connected with the "campaign" to surpass the United States in the per
capita production of milk, butter, and meat, which was launched by Khrushchev
in May 1957.
88Byanalogy with monetary economics, "depreciation" may be more apt
than "devaluation," since what I have in mind here is not an official downward
redefinition of the use-value of a physical unit of the commodity, but a spon-
taneous and possibly continuous process of attrition of value, like the external
or internal depreciation of a currency. However, I forego the term "deprecia-
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are limits to this. Soviet goods are generally not of "zero quality."
The devaluation is checked or even reversed by other forces, such as
fear of criminal or administrative sanctions, the impact of the cus-
tomer's countervailing power, financial inducement (which may
vary with the quality of the product), and the producer's pride of
workmanship or his sense of responsibility to society. In this section
we shall discuss the effect of this devaluation on the quality and
intracommodity assortment of goods.
QUALITY
Deliberate deterioration of quality may be regarded as an alterna-
tive, and generally a safer and easier alternative, to write-ups
among the Soviet manager's methods of simulating plan fulfillment.
Indeed: "Deliberate deterioration of quality is a classic form of
simulation."87
We have seen that the laying down of minimum quality stand-
ards from above is of particular importance in the Soviet economy
because of the weakness or absence of some of those forces that
tend to maintain or raise quality in a market economy. Itis
especially so in view of the built-in tendency to stress quantity at
the expense of quality. Consequently, violation of quality standards.
or specifications is a serious criminal offense. The major prewar
tion" to avoid confusion with its other meaning within the context of an industrial
enterprise. Still by analogy with monetary economies, devaluation of the physical
unit of measure may also be thought of as an inflation in the quantity-to-use-
value ratio. The analogy, incidentally, is not so far-fetched if we consider that
the ruling behavioral principles in the Soviet economy and in a market
economy are, respectively, maximization of output in physical terms and
maximization of money profits. "Following the rules of the game," entrepre-
neurs in a market economy push for higher sales prices, thereby tending to
depreciate the currency, while Soviet managers contribute to devaluation of
the physical unit of measure and (it may be added) also to inflation of the
so-called constant ruble prices, such as the notorious 1926/27 prices, in terms
of which their plan fulfillment is evaluated.
Berliner, op.cit., p. 136. In view of this and of the high incidence of iow-
quality output in Soviet industrial practice, the following statement by Berliner
is open to question: "Of the various courses of action open to the manager for
simulating plan fulfillment, quality deterioration is fraught with the greatest
danger. It is certainly not resorted to lightly, nor without considerable assurance
that it can be gotten away with" (ibid., p. 155). If what the author has in
mind here, as appears from the context, is not any deterioration, but one that
brings the quality level below acceptable standards, i.e.results in spoilage
(brak), the statement is perhaps more defensible. But even so, the very fre-
quent complaints that goods are substandard or incompletely assembled suggest
that the decision is not as difficult to make for the Soviet manager as one
might assume from the above statement.
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legislative acts in this regard were a resolution of SNK, dated
December 8, 1933, which provided for sentences of up to five years
for producing goods of low quality or delivering incomplete prod-
ucts, and (this time on the highest legislative level) an edict of the
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, dated July 10, 1940, which
provided for sentences of five to eight years.88 The latter asserted
that "the output of industrial products that are of poor quality or
incomplete or that violate compulsory standards is a crime against
the state equivalent to wrecking." The provisions of the 1940 edict
were interpreted by the USSR Supreme Court to apply to goods
that had passed OTK and were ready for delivery to the customer,
as well as to goods actually in other words, to goods
reportable as "finished output." However, except possibly immedi-
ately after their enactment, these criminal sanctions seem to have
been quite unsuccessful in attaining their objectives. This much is
clear from the ever-present complaints in the Soviet press, from the
testimony of former eyewitnesses, and even from official admission.
The official admission came in connection with the next legislative
act, the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers, dated Sep-
tember 23, which stated that "executive officials of the
ministries and departments struggle unsatisfactorily to improve the
quality of output, as provided for in the edict...of1940...and
connive with the violators of the edict" while "the Procuracy of
the USSR...dischargesunsatisfactorily its absolute obligation to
enforce the edict...." Theresolution went on to specify a long
list of administrative measures, including the strengthening of qual-
ity control departments (OTK), aimed at improving the situation,
and charged the law enforcement agencies anew with enforcing the
provisions of the 1940 edict. It is not clear whether there has been
any substantial change in quality of output since 1952, but there
is daily evidence in the Soviet press that the low quality of indus-
trial products and the delivery of uncompleted (or incompletely
assembled) articles remain very serious problems. It is hard to be-
lieve that a considerable portion of it is not deliberate, in the sense
88Kh.E. Bakhchisaraitsev, Spravochnik zakonodatel'sttudlia rabotnikov
gosudarstvennoi promyshlennosti SSSR [Legal Manual for Personnel in State
Industry in the USSR], Moscow, 1951, pp. 372ff. See also the discussion of
these acts and of their enforcement (or lack of it) in Berliner, op.cit., p. 153.
89Bakhchisaraitsev,op.cit., 373 3).
40Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskogopravitel stva p0 khoziaistvennym voprosam
[Directives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet
Government on Economic Subjects], Vol. in,Moscow,1958, pp. 642ff.
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of being a conscious response to the incentive structure in the
industrial enterprise.
Since deliberate quality deterioration is an alternative to write-
ups as a method of simulating good performance, one may expect
that as often as not the two vary inversely over the short run, one
being practiced and the other eschewed according to the side from
which "the heat is on" at the given moment. An event such as the
enactment of the 1940 edict may, at least temporarily, shift the
balance between the two. In the long run, however, the incidence
of quality deterioration and of write-ups may well vary together,
since both are responses to the same fundamental circumstances,
i.e. the severity of the plans, the efficiency (or inefficiency) of the
supply system, the structure of rewards for plan fulfillment, the
harshness of the political atmosphere, and so forth.
INTRACOMMODITY ASSORTMENT
In addition to a specified unit of measure, every product possesses
by its very nature other quantitative dimensions. For example, if
the specified unit is a weight unit, the other quantitative dimensions
may be size, count, area, rated capacity, andsoforth. Thus, since
the product may vary according to a number of physical criteria
while being reported as a single commodity measured in terms of
a single (specified) physical unit, we can speak of intracommodity
assortment; this is not to be confused with intercommodity assort-
ment, where the various commodities are explicitly specified in the
enterprise's plan and which, of course, gives rise to the classic
Soviet "problem of Needless to say, there is no sharp
line separating quality and intracommodity assortment, but the dis-
tinction may nonetheless be useful.42
But while there are strong over-all legal sanctions against low-
quality output and less severe sanctions against the violation of
intercommodity assortment plans, there seem to be none directed
specifically against improper intracommodity assortment. By defini-
41 See Berliner, op.cit., Chapter viii.
42 See John P. Hardt, "Economics of the Soviet Electric Power Industry"
(processed), Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1955, Chapter Iv; and
idem, "Soviet Capacity Will Not Provide for Industrial Load Growth by
1960," Electrical Engineering, November 1956. Thisisnot to be confused
with the fact that in the USSR electrical output is expressed gross of con-
sumption by the power stations for their own uses, while in the U.S. it is
expressed net of such consumption (see V.S., 1958, No. 1, p. 85). For com-
parability, postwar Soviet figures should be reduced by about 6 per cent (see
Promyshlennost' SSSR [The Industry of the USSR], Moscow, 1957, p. 21).
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tion, intracommodity assortment is not specified in the enterprise's
plan; hence, nonfulfillment of the plan is not involved, although
noncompliance with contractual provisions may be and often is.
And yet the problem is an important one for the operation of the
Soviet economy as well as for the appraisal of Soviet statistics.
Even if we disregard time-utility and space-utility, it is very
difficult to think of an industrial commodity that is entirely homo-
geneous, at least, short of such a fine breakdown of commodity
nomenclature that would render it impracticable for planning and
statistical purposes. At any rate, the enterprise usually has some
choice, and often a great deal of choice, in intracommodity assort-
ment while fulfilling the plan for the given product in terms of
the specified physical unit of measure. It will obviously tend to
select the assortment that will maximize "physical" output of the
commodity, given the resources of the enterprise. If the specified
unit of measure is changed by directive from above, as it may be
in order to induce a change in assortment, the enterprise will tend
to adjust the intracommodity assortment to maximize "physical"
output under the new conditions. A striking illustration, no less in-
structive for possibly being apocryphal, is provided by Nove:48
"The classic example of this is a factory which makes nails. When
the plan was established in numbers, only small nails were made;
so the basis of the plan was changed to weight, and then there were
only large nails. If the plan is expressed in money, then only those
which are cheapest to make will be produced, and probably all of
the same size; if each type of nail is to be separately specified in
the plan, this would be a glaring case of bureaucratic over-cen-
tralization."
Many actual examples may be cited. Thus, the output of wool
cloth being measured in linear meters, its width averages 106 cm,
compared to a technical optimum of 142 cm.44 The average width of
A.Nove, "The Pace of Soviet Economic Development," Lloyds Bank Re-
view, April 1956, p. 10. It must be noted that considerations other than fiil-
fihiment of the production plan also affect the management's decision with
regard to assortment. For example, D. D. Kondrashev (Tsenoobrazovanie o
promyshlennosti SSSR [Price Formation in USSR Industry], Moscow, 1956,
pp. 136-138) assigns considerable importance to the relative profitability of
products as a determinant of the assortment.
trud, 1957, No. 1, p. 50, cited by A. Nove in "The
Problem of 'Success Indicators' in Soviet Industry," Economica, February 1958,
p. 7. Cf. Kontorovich in P.E.G., Oct. 3, 1956. In 1959 the specified physical
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linen cloth diminished in the past quarter century as follows:
1932—101.5 cm, 1940—96 cm, 1955—90.3 cm.45 "A certain metal
works increased its output of roofing iron in a five-year period by
20 per cent in tons, but by only 10 per cent in square meters; the
plan, of course, was expressed in tons, and the enterprise reached
its output target by an economically and technically unnecessary
increase in weight."46 The targets for finished steel, castings, and
many kinds of machinery are usually set in tons; hence the well-
known tendency for Soviet plants to produce unnecessarily heavy
products of this sort.4T At times this may be done within the limits
of standard specifications by including the maximum permissible
"positive tolerances" (pliusovyc dopuski) in such finished steel
products as beams, plate, and pipe. These practices in the steel and
machine-building industries were the subject of a special lengthy
resolution of the Council of Ministers, dated August 16, 1952,48
and were also singled out by Bulganin in his report on industrial
efficiency to the Party Central Committee in July But even
unit of measure for all textile fabrics was apparently changed from linear
meters to square meters; Pravda, July 14, 1959, p. 2.
A. M. Korneev, Tekstil'naia promyshlennost' SSSR i puti ee razvitiia [The
USSR Textile Industry and Ways of Its Development], Moscow, 1957, p. 277.
46Sotgialisticheskiitrud, 1957, No. 1, p. 50, as quoted by Nove in Economica,
February 1958, p.5. Similarly with regard to paper where the quest for
tonnage leads to fewer, but heavier, units of area, and incidentally also to
below-plan unit cost (P.E.G., March 22, 1957, p. 3).
For a discussion of this particular phenomenon, see M. A. Tseitlin, "0
natural'nom izmerenii promyshlennoi produktsii" [On Measuring Industrial
Output in Physical Terms] in Nauchnye zapiski [Scientific Notes] Leningrad,
1955, p. 49; and with regard to machinery in general, see Finansy SSSR, 1957,
No. 6, p. 19. Specifically with respect to steel pipe, see the article by Petukhov
in F.E.C., July 13, 1956, p. 2; with regard to consumer hardware, see the
article by Emdin in P.E.G., Sept. 7, 1958, p. 3.
48DirektivyKPSS, Vol. in, pp. 634ff. On the problem of "positive tolerances"
for building materials, see G. E. Paraubek, "Nekotorye voprosy kachestva
stroitel'stva' [Some Questions of the Quality of Construction] in Voprosy
ekonomicheskoi effektivnosti novoi tekhniki v stroitel'stve [Problems of the
Economic Efficiency of New Construction Processes], Moscow, 1958, p. 375;
with respect to finished steel products, the article by Barngol'ts in P.E.G., June
27, 1956, p. 3.
Pravda, July 17, 1955. The problem was brought up again at the XXI
Party Congress (January-February 1959). A delegate from Moscow charged
that "nearly all the rolled steel arriving at factories manufacturing reinforced
concrete [construction] components has positive tolerances. Last year's labora-
tory tests showed that 83 per cent of the tested items of reinforcing steel had
positive tolerances, which in the case of 50 per cent considerably exceeded
even the maximal standards" (speech by V. I. Ustinov, Pravda, Jan. 29, 1959,
p. 3). Another speaker, L. I. Brezhnev, noted similar complaints about rolled
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if a seemingly more rational physical unit is specified for equipment,
it may turn out perversely. Thus Pravda reported: "The output
of heating furnaces is being incorrectly planned: the factories' plans
arenotin terms of number of funiaces with allowances for their
heating capacity, thermal efficiency, and other characteristics, but in
terms of [square] meters of heat-transfer surface. Therefore a bulky
and ineffective furnace such as Universal-3 turns out to be more
advantageous to produce than a compact modern furnace."50
Two other instances, however, may be cited at some length
because they have received careful analysis in Soviet sources, in
itself a rare occurrence. The first is a case study of the glass industry
conducted by Tseitlin during his interesting inquiry into the logic of
physical units of measure in the planning of industrial
At one time a variety of units was employed, but in the early thirties
tonnage became the specified physical dimension in all branches
of the glass industry (window glass, bottles, flasks, tumblers). It
was chosen for easier production planning (i.e. the construction of
input-output ratios, capacity utilization rates, etc.) since both the
raw materials for glassmaking and the semifinished product, raw
glass, were measured by weight. It was, so to say, material-oriented.
But this led the plants to produce the thickest and heaviest sheet
glass and glassware, thus greatly contributing to the acute shortage
of glass and glassware generally at the time. (The production of
thick window glass was also stimulated by technical difficulties in
mastering the new continuous sheet glassmaking process.) Seen
another way, the materials for glassmaking, especially alkali, which
were also very scarce, were being used very ineffectively. The crisis
finally led to a special resolution of SNK, dated April 2, 1934, which
imposed utility-oriented rather than material-oriented units of meas-
ure: square meters for window glass, and number of pieces for
glassware. Tseitlin does not say what happened after that, and
whether only the thinnest window glass and the smallest and thin-
nest glassware has been produced since, or whether this has been
avoided (as in Nove's nail example) by a finer breakdown of the
nomenclature, with attendant risks of overcentralization.
steel products in general, alluded to unspecified measures against the practice
supposedly worked out by the Party and the government, and appealed to the
steel industry to manufacture rolled steel products with negative tolerances so
as to "save hundreds of thousands of tons of metal" (Pravda, Jan. 31, 1959,
p. 9).
Pravda,Sept. 5, 1958, p. 2.
51.Tseitlin,op.cit.
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It may be worth digressing to note that Tseitlin's thesis is that a
single specified physical unit of measure is not desirable in most
industries. Instead he would have concurrently a material-oriented
unit, to facilitate production planning and materials allocation, and
a utility-oriented unit, to ensure the production of usable goods.
One of them, preferably the latter, would have priority as a success
indicator for the enterprise. But his relatively flexible approach
still leaves certain questions unanswered. For instance, if the con-
version coefficient between the two units is not fixed (and if it is,
one of the units is redundant), will the Soviet system of planning
be able to cope with dual units? And, more important, how is it
possible to ensure the right intracommodity assortment with a suc-
cess indicator based chiefly on a single specified unit of measure,
even if that unit is utility-oriented?
The second instance is a criticism of a proposal to change the
specified physical unit in the tanning industry from an area unit
to a weight unit, and is of particular interest because it came from
the pen of the director of a tannery, a certain Mindin.52 He noted
that in 1930, in order to improve the quality and increase the
quantity of output (presumably in terms of area!), the plans of
tanneries had been changed from a weight basis to an area basis.
In 1935 a few tanneries had reconverted for planning and statistical
purposes to a weight basis, and at the time of his writing the whole
industry had been directed to reconvert to a weight unit by 1936.
This directive, in Mindin's view, was a retrograde step because it
would induce tanneries to obtain the maximum number of kilograms
of leather from a given amount of raw material. (He did not
discuss whether it was rational to obtain the maximum number
of square meters of leather from the supply of hides.) To explain
how the tanneries would do this, Mindin presented, in considerable
detail, nine ways of maximizing leather output in terms of weight,
some of which are worth citing. Thus, the tanneries would not clean
the hides well; they would let the hides soak up excessive amounts
of chemicals and tanning extracts, and would not bother to rinse
these out; and they would leave a high moisture content in the
leather. Mindin wrote as though these practices would be virtual
certainties if the unit of measure were changed, and implied that
52V.V. Mindin, "Za planirovanie i uchet vykhodov gotovoi produktsii p0
ploshchadi" [For Planning and Recording Finished Output in Terms of Areaj,
Kozhevenno-obuvnaia prom yshlennost' SSSR, 1936, No. 3, pp. 46f.
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they would go into effect immediately after the change-over. It
appears that the change-over did take place.
To conclude the discussion of intracommodity assortment, for our
purpose the crucial events are: (1) the change-over in the speci-
fied physical unit of measure, and (2) the change in the scope of
the commodity category, that is, its aggregation or disaggregalion.
As to (1), substitution of one specified physical unit of measure
for another presumably tends to bring about a quick adjustment
of intracommodity assortment on the part of the enterprises to
correspond to the new situation. Now it does not matter here
whether the new assortment is in some sense an improvement over
the old. What matters is that a chained series that purports to
represent the physical output of that commodity, spliced at t (the
year of the change-over) will show a greater growth (smaller
decline) than if the serieswereexpressed either in the new or in
the old unit throughout. The more numerous are such change-overs
during the period in question, the greater presumably is the degree
of exaggeration, except, of course, when restoration of a previous
specified unit of measure permits direct physical comparison be-
tween early and late years in the output time series.
As to (2), an aggregation of the commodity category in the
enterprise's plan probably gives additional scope for the manage-
ment to manipulate intracommodity assortment to its advantage,
and thus to devalue the physical unit of measure. Disaggregation
works in the opposite direction. This must be borne in mind in
connection with the fluctuations in the detail of planning. In recent
years the tendency has been toward less detail in the central plan,
and possibly also less detail in the plans of the enterprises, i.e.
toward aggregation in commodity categories.
To recapitulate, other things being equal, devaluation of the
physical unit of measure may occur in four ways: continuously,
owing to the emphasis on quantity at the expense of quality and to
the seeking out of more advantageous intracommodity
and discretely following change-overs in specified units of measure
and aggregation of commodity categories. (Disaggregation of corn-
It may be that the steady increase in the average ash content of coal
mined in the USSR—15.2 per cent in 1940,17.1 in1950, and 18.7 in 1957
(P.E.G., Aug. 20, 1958, p. 2 )—is a case in point. The authors who cite these
figures and many other instances of the deterioration of the quality of coal and
of relative shortages of better grades of coal, while poorer grades are in over-
supply, argue that it is within the power of the coal industry to reverse these
trends by paying greater attention to quality.
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modity categories tends to have the opposite effect.) Of course,
other things do not remain equal, and we cannot conclude from
this analysis that the quality of Soviet industrial products has
steadily deteriorated. On the contrary, there have undoubtedly been
periods in Soviet history when the quality of industrial products
was generally rising.
Underreporting; Write-Düwns
While the tendency of Soviet enterprises to overreport output has
been, on the whole, well known to students of the Soviet economy
for some time, before the publication of Berliner's inquiry there
seems to have been less appreciation of the tendency to underre-
port physical output.54
Much of the underreporting is either a consequence or a by-
product of widespread pilferage and theft of "socialist" property
by workers and employees of industrial plants, or by outsiders. In-
deed, petty crimes of this nature are so often mentioned or alluded
to in the Soviet literature and are so frequently related by former
Soviet citizens that it is not necessary to give specific citations
Some of the stealing is done rather ingeniously; much ap-
parently with the connivance or even active participation of the
numerous
A priori, one would expect pilferage and theft to be a relatively
higher percentage of total output where: (1) the goods are not too
heavy or bulky to steal, smuggle out of the plant, carry away, and
"Berliner, op.cit., PP. 164ff. Earlier recognition of the presence of under-
reporting appeared in Alexander Gerschenkron, "Reliability of Soviet Industrial
and National Income Statistics," The American Statistician, April-May 1953,
P. 18; and in Nove in Lloyds Bank Review, pp. 2f.
Boris Konstantinovsky in Soviet Law in Action—The Recollected Cases
of a Soviet Lawyer (Cambridge, Mass., 1953, P. 19) offers the following in-
teresting observation:"Mass thefts inSoviet enterprises and the tolerant
attitude of public workers to thieves of 'socialist' property are also explained
by the fact that not only the Soviet state, but the Soviet worker, stricfly
distinguishes between state and personal property. People of unimpeachable
honesty, with whom one could trust any kind of 'personal' property, busy
themselves with the systematic theft of state goods—simply because a Soviet
worker's pay is lower than the barest 'living' minimum."
Aformer Soviet citizen has related to me from personal experience how
large amounts of fish were smuggled out by the workers of a fish-curing plant
with the tacit consent of the guards. Indeed, articles in law enforcement
journals, such as Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost', suggest that the guards are
often the first to be suspected in any investigation of theft, and with good
cause.
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store;57 (2) the goods are such that they can be readily sold or
exchanged on some sort of black or open market (e.g. consumer
goods, small hardware, spare parts, etc.)(3) average real wages
are low compared to previous years, or are declining; (4) rationing
obtains; (5) open or black market prices are high; and (6) enforce-
ment is less strict.
Pilferage and theft by workers and employees (including man-
agerial personnel) may or may not result in the underrecording
and underreporting of output. Obviously, if the stealing takes place
before the output is recorded, neither the enterprise's books nor its
reports to higher authorities, nor for that matter the published sta-
tistics, will include the stolen portion of the product (unless, of
course, there is a conscious attempt to correct the books accordingly,
in which case the "technical" problems of recording and reporting
are the same as with write-ups). If the stealing takes place after
the output is initially recorded, the consequence is either an ap-
parent inventory shortage or a conscious attempt by management
to conceal inventory shortage by writing down output. In the event
of such a write-down, again, the data available to the higher au-
thorities, and therefore also the published statistics, will not include
the stolen portion of the output—unless, of course, at some level
above the enterprise a correction is made on this score.5°
Apart from this, Soviet management may—and does—write down
physical output for the following reasons: (1) to ensure a "safety
factor" in future plan fulfillment; (2) to "play the rates" of the
However, under favorable conditions even most bulky goods are appar-
ently stolen by workers. In a feuitleton describing the tribulations of private
citizens building their own homes, Pravda (July 2, 1958, p. 3) writes:
"Stone and cement [for private home construction] are supplied by people
whose hearts are not of stone. These hearts beat fast at the sight of a bribe.
Certain storekeepers at construction organizations easily trade scarce cement
for altogether unscarce vodka; while dump trucks loaded with building stone
willingly change their destinations, and, for a standard price of 80 rubles,
unload on the private builders' lots." In these instances, no underreporting of
cement output is presumably involved since the theft takes place not at the
cement plant but at the storehouse of a construction organization. Whether
the building stone comes directly from the quarry or not is not clear; if it does,
possibly its output is correspondingly underrecorded.
58 See the account by Konstantinovsky (op.cit.,pp. 18-22) of the pilferage
problem faced by a large bread-baking establishment for which he was legal
counsel. For a recent account of blatant pilferage by the whole staff of a meat-
packing plant, from the director down to the guards, see the article by Krasnov
in Pravda, July 10, 1959, p. 6.
For such corrections at higher levels, see the discussion of milk production
statistics at the end of the next chapter.
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premiums scales; (3) to conceal illicit diversion of goods, and the
embezzlement of funds that frequently accompanies it; (4) to con-
ceal production for own use; and (5) to evade taxation and other
obligations to the state.
REASONS (1) AND(2)
Berliner finds that Soviet management is on guard against giving
the appearance of such plan overfuiflilment as will result in a more
difficult future assignment. It strives to preserve a margin of safety
to facilitate plan fulfillment in the future. When there is substantial
overfulfihiment in a given period, it may "lend" output to the next
period; that is, it may deliberately write down one period's output,
and correspondingly write up output in a future period. Under the
same circumstances, management may also "lend" output to the
next period in order to assure itself of premiums for plan fulfillment
in the next period. Berliner concludes:60
"The combined operation of the premium motivation and the safety
factor results in a tendency to falsify reported fulfillment in a way
that evens out the reported month by month plan fulfillment. In the
unsuccessful months output is 'borrowed' from the future and in
the successful months output is 'lent' to the future or 'repaid' to
the past."
However, as with the "borrowing" technique discussed above, the
writing down that a future
period—be it motivated by the safety factor or by premiums—is in
itself unlikely to affect significantly the reliability of physical out-
put data (especially for whole industries) for larger segments of
time, such as a year. Of more lasting importance may be write-
downs of types (3), (4),and (5).
BEASON(3)
The illicit diversion of "socialist property" by managerial person-
nel may be—and undoubtedly often is—simply for the direct per-
sonal benefit of the individual. As such, it is not very different, for
the present purpose, from pilferage and theft by anyone else, and
the problems of underreporting and writing down that have been
60Berliner,op.cit.,pp. 165f.The use of theborrowing-lendingtechnique,
with deliberate underreporting in some periods, is also reported in agricultural
procurement in P.Zh., 1955, No. 11, P. 28; and for an industrial plant in V.S.,
1956, No. 1, p. 80.
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indicated earlier in this chapter apply here too. (However, we may
note that managerial personnel has power not only over the goods
themselves, but also over the paperwork that is supposed to control
the transfer and disposal of goods. Hence it presumably has greater
latitude in falsifying, or not falsifying, records than do others who
"help themselves" to the goods.)
But at times the illicit diversion of goods may be for the enhance-
ment of the position of the enterprise as such, personal benefit being
indirect or secondary. "Gifts" to suppliers, party officials, inspectors,
and auditors; the distribution of goods (or cash obtained from un-
authorized sale of goods) to the enterprise's personnel as incentives;
barter transactions of various sorts; sales at illegally high prices in
order to replenish the till—these are some of the uses to which
goods under the control of the management may be put in order to
further the interests of the enterprise as such. At times such trans-
actions are extremely complicated; and, of course, the direct inter-
ests of the individual (theft, embezzlement) and the interests of the
enterprise may be furthered by the same transaction. Often the logic
of such situations demands that the goods be deliberately under-
reported and underrecorded.
An illuminating case of write-downs was described in some detail
by the investigating judge who cracked it. A certain kombinat (ver-
tically integrated enterprise) producing starch and syrup from
potatoes had large amounts of potato waste. To utilize it, a dis-
tillery was added to the establishment. There being no records of
the waste going for fermentation and no mechanical device to
measure the amount of alcohol produced, the way was open for
illicit transactions. Only some of the alcohol was officially recorded
and reported. "The unrecorded alcohol was systematically pilfered
by the personnel of the kombinat and in part was expended in pay-
ment of various jobs [for the kombinat]. The material damages in-
flicted on the state in this manner totaled, at current wholesale
prices, 2,642,000 rubles."°'
It is also interesting to note what the alcohol was bartered for. The
kombinat itself obtained a generator, packaging material, and
various supplies. The chief accountant personally traded the alcohol
for flour and other consumer goods, her customer being a village
61S.Z.,1948,No.5, pp.47-49.Cf.I.Ia. German, Finansot)yi kontrol' i
dokumental'naia reviziia v mestnoi prom yshi ennosti RSFSR [Financial Control
and Documents Audit in Local Industry in the RSFSR], Moscow, 1948, p. 61,
where the illicit sale of unrecorded output at a chemical plant is mentioned.
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cooperative store. The personnel of the store in turn entered the
alcohol on the books as vodka, pocketing the difference in value.
In the above case, writing down was easy because neither the
input nor the output was systematically recorded. If the input is
strictly controlled, the limits on write-downs are presumably nar-
rower, and any serious rise in the input-output ratio may alert
superiors to the pilferage.62 But a seemingly safer and probably
much more widespread method of writing down output than not
recording it at all is to record above-standard products as brak
(spoilage, rejects). The practice is reported by Berliner's inform-
ants,63 and auditors are alerted to it in Soviet textbooks.64 As Ber-
liner notes, for this reason enterprises may overreport brak up to the
maximum limit permitted by regulations. Because of the peculiarities
of the price system, the goods so reclassified are at times sold, under
the guise of brak, for much more than they would bring at the fixed
prices applicable to above-standard products.
REASON (4)
Because of the pronounced and persistent sellers' market, Soviet
enterprises tend. to establish their own sources of supply. For the
same reason, they would tend, under some conditions, to avoid re-
porting the production of goods for their own use, lest they be
deprived of outside supplies or be forced to market their own inter-
mediate products. I have no direct evidence that such concealment
of production takes place, but it is strongly suggested by the logic
of the situation, as well as by ample indication in the Soviet litera-
ture and other sources that enterprises go to great lengths to conceal
inventories of materials and other inputs. The step from the under-
62Thiswas the way in which pilferage was uncovered in the bakery case
described by Konstantinovsky (footnote 58 above). An accounting expert
recently wrote in the journal of the Ministry of Finance: "Financial auditors
•.. mustkeep in mind that materials expenditure in excess of plan ... may
frequently conceal an inventory shortage or failure to record output" (Finansy
SSSR, 1958, No. 6, P. 48; my italics). Thus one way to conceal pilferage of
the product is to underrecord the inputs received from the outside. In the
meat-packing plant case (footnote 58), this was done by cheating the collec-
tive farms on the weight of the livestock delivered by them to the plant. Any-
way, in this case the existence of pilferage was known to city authorities, but
they took no action because the director "was fulfilling his plan." (Of course,
the city fathers may have been "in" on the pilferage in a more tangible way
as well.)
63Berliner,op.cit., pp. 146f. Cf. Granick, op.cit., p. 148.
64SeeGerman, op.cit., p. 38; and A. Kh. Ermolaev and G. R. Nak, Doku-
mental'naia reviziia na zheleznodorozhnom transporte [Documents Audit on
Railroads], 2nd ed., Moscow, 1950, p. 124. The latter mentions the illicit sale
of nails without appropriate allocation orders under the guise of brak.
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statement of inventories of materials to the underreporting of pro-.
duction for own use seems to be a small one.
With regard to such inventories, the incentive is strong and only
in one direction: to understate. The pages of Vestnik statistiki are
full of complaints by the statistical authorities in this regard. For
instance, one article in this journal presents a very instructive de-
scription of the heights of ingenuity scaled by enterprises in the
concealment of inventory, and of the progressive elaboration of the
census blank by the statistical authorities to counteract the efforts
at concealment.65 It is interesting to note that the MVD (Ministry
of Internal Affairs) itself is not immune to concealing inventories.
A German scientist who spent some time in a research establish-
ment operated by the MVD describes the burying of stocks of sup-
plies in the ground by camp authorities before the arrival of an
auditing commission.
REASON (5)
Lastly, deliberate underreporting may take place to evade taxes
and other obligations to the state. This would apply particularly to
enterprises not owned by the state. We have already noted that at
the end of the twenties TsS U believed that the returns from the
then still extant private industrial enterprises understated their out-
put. The same may well be true of the reports of industrial co-
operatives during the Plan era, which have been subject to taxes
on profits since 1930 and to very highly progressive taxes since
1933.67 While I have no evidence on this score, it is reasonable to
suppose that industrial cooperatives (including the industrial es-
tablishments subsidiary to tend to write down their out-
put in order to understate their net profits or to facilitate the illegal
(but profitable) disposal of their products. While the share of co-
operatives in over-all industrial output is rather smalloS and has
65P.Pod'iachikh, "0 nedostatkakh v provedenii perepisei rnaterialovi
proverki ikh itogov" [On the Shortcomings in the Conducting of Censuses of
Materials and in the Checking of Their Results], V.S., 1951, No. 5, passim.
66OttoMaar, "Kutschino," Der Monat, February 1955, pp. 409-424.
87Fora brief history of taxes on industrial cooperatives, see Franidyn Holz-
man, Soviet Taxation: The Fiscal and Monetarbi Problems of a Planned Econ-
omw, Cambridge, Mass., 1955, pp. 211-213.
68Accordingto official Soviet data, and in terms of the official industrial
production index, cooperative and private establishments accounted for the
following shares of the total gross output of industry in the given years:
1928 19371950 1955 1956
Cooperative 13.0 9.5 8.2 8.1 6
"Capitalist and petty private" 17.6 0.2nonenonenone
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been declining over the long run, nevertheless it continues to be
significant in certain lines of production. Furthermore, if there is a
significant difference in the accuracy of reporting between similar
state-owned and cooperative enterprises (on which there is no
evidence at hand), then the transfer of a large number of enter-
prises from cooperative to state ownership in a short span of time, as
happened in 1956,69 may appreciably distort output comparisons for
certain commodities over the period in question.
Checks to Distortion
Enough has been said in the preceding sections of this chapter to
demonstrate the existence of strong forces working to distort pro-
duction statistics at the enterprise level. These forces spring chiefly
from the self-serving activities of producers, although at times the
motive may be devotion to duty conceived in a broad sense. The
distortion may be accomplished intentionally in order to simulate
the fulfillment of norms and plans, to reduce effort per unit of
reported output, to have a "safety factor," or to conceal the diversion
of goods to unauthorized uses. Or it may be carried out uninten-
tionally (if not entirely unknowingly, let alone unsuspectedly), as
in the case of underreporting occasioned by the theft of products
before they even reach the stage of primary recording.
While distortion thus indisputably takes place in the reporting of
industrial output within and by the enterprise, it is also obvious that
it must be subject to certain limits. This not only suggests itself
intuitively, but may be inferred from an examination of the pub-
lished statistics, which are not patently nonsensical, and may be
deduced from what we know of the operation of the Soviet eco-
nomic system. (Consider that the existence of the "safety factor" in
production planning as a principle of managerial behavior is in itself
presumptive evidence that there are limits to statistical falsification
by the Soviet manager, for if he could report any output figure at
will he would have no need to attempt to obtain an easy plan.) But
the limits to distortion are surely not primarily imposed by the in-
cessant exhortations to abide by "high principles," or even by the
mere existence of the relevant laws and regulations on the books.
(Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1956 godu [USSR National Economy in 1956},
Moscow, 1957, p. 47.)
69Notethe sharp decline from 1955 to 1956inthe share of cooperatives
shown in the preceding footnote. During 1956 some half million working
persons were affected by the transfer of ownership (ibid., p. 50).
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Rather, they are defined by the realities of the situation as perceived
by the individuals in question. That is to say, attempts to distort are
subject to checks from various directions. Generally speaking, in
the subjective estimation of the individual, the risks of detection and
punishment at some point begin to exceed the benefits obtainable
from the falsffication of production data; therefore he does not go
beyond that point. The estimation is subjective in two senses: (1)
it takes place in the individual's mind; and (2) it reflects the in-
dividual's specific and unique situation, that is, his needs and aspira-
tions, his relations with superiors, co-workers, and subordinates, the
desperateness (if any) of his position, and so forth.
The checks on attempts to distort output data can be loosely clas-
sified into four categories: (1) checks within the enterprise itself;
(2) control and supervision by administrative superiors; (3) con-
trol and supervision by the numerous Soviet auditing and law-en-
forcing agencies (other than administrative superiors) which we
may call "the outside authorities"; and (4) checks by transactors,
especially the buyer and the common carrier. These categories are
not to be taken rigidly; the lines of demarcation between them are
often vague. For example, the Party may be regarded as an outside
authority or as an element within the enterprise, or (in a sense)
even as an administrative superior.
Because of the strong subjective element in the picture and also
because the "objective" conditions that deter or facilitate distortion
of output data vary in time and space, it will obviously be impos-
sible for me to define the exact points at which these checks begin
to be effective. Instead, this section will examine why the four
categories of checks, taken separately, fail as absolute preventives
of inaccurate reporting. What is there in the nature of these checks
and in the environment within which they operate that permits a
certain amount of distortion in the reporting of output within and
by the enterprise?
1. CHECKS WITHIN THE ENTERPRISE
Besides the director and the shop chiefs, who by virtue of their
positions are the main culprits in this drama, the Soviet industrial
enterprise typically contains a number of persons who are in some
way—administratively, criminally, or financially—responsible for
the truthfulness of production records and reports. The more im-
portant of these are: (a) the chief accountant, who, of course, is
responsible for the accuracy of all of the important paper work in
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the enterprise, and who for this reason is supposed to be the cham-
pion of state interests within the enterprise; (b) the head of the
planning department, who, along with the director and the chief
accountant, signs the periodic reports; (c) the chief of the OTK
and his quality inspectors, who pass on the quality of output, and
especially on its adherence to minimum standards; (d) the ware-
house superintendents and storekeepers, who formally receive fin-
ished output and are charged with the safekeeping of inventory;
(e) the secretary of the Party unit within the enterprise, whose
functions in the plant are to ensure compliance with the law and to
spur production; and lastly (f) the secretary of the trade union
local within the enterprise, whose role, however, I shall not discuss
because it is relatively unimportant for our purposes.
In the cases of all of these persons, malfeasance of duty, and es-
pecially falsification or other distortion of records and reports, is
severely punishable by law. It would, therefore, seem that with so
many watchdogs within the walls of his plant, the director's ability
to distort output data with reasonable expectation of impunity is
very limited indeed. But in fact this is not so, for under ordinary
conditions, the loyalty of all these individuals, including the Party
secretary,7° is often first to the enterprise and to each other, and
only then to the regime or to "socialist legality" in some abstract
sense. They are all enmeshed in a heavy "web of mutual involve-
ment," as Berliner puts it. As he explains:71
"Awareness of common interests in plan fulfillment often gen-
erates within the enterprise a 'family relationship' in which Party
secretary, chief accountant, and other control officials facilitate or
overlook the transgressions of an enterprising and successful direc-
tor and share in the rewards and prestige that come with plan ful-
fillment. It is the fact that the control officials perceive their own
fates as closely interwoven with the success of the enterprise that
explains the endurance of the irregular practices of management
[including the falsification of reports—C.G. II."
Tothis succinct description one need only add the consideration
that the Soviet manager wields great power over his subordinates
and is therefore usually able to enlist their passive or active co-
operation in his illicit activities. Once the subordinate has coop-
Cf. Berliner, op.cit.,Chapterxm, and pp.264-271,324f.
Ibid., pp.324f.
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erated, he has compromised himself in the eyes of the law and
weaves his own interests more readily into the fabric of mutual
involvement.
The chief accountant is looked upon by the regime as the guard-
ian of legality, and of the state's interests in general, within his
enterprise or organization. His appointment, dismissal, or transfer,
as well as the awarding of premiums and bonuses to him, is formally
undertaken by the agency superior to the one in which he is em-
ployed. Interference with his duties is punishable by law.72 And yet,
the accountant's pliability in the hands of the manager is a well-
established, almost proverbial, fact, amply attested to both by the
continual exhortations addressed to him in the Soviet literature and
by the reports of
The situation is similar with the chief of the department of quality
control (OTK), the regime's guardian of quality standards. Despite
the severe criminal penalties for the production and shipment of
substandard or incomplete articles, which penalties apply speci-
fically to the chief of OTK, he is typically under great and often
irresistible pressure from the director and other officers of the enter-
prise not to reject products or to upgrade This fact received
full and frank recognition in the resolution of the USSR Council of
Ministers, dated September 23, 1952, on improving the quality of
industrial output, to which I have already referred. The resolution
stated that the OTK "perform their tasks unsatisfactorily...are
inadequately staffed with competent personnel and enjoy little au-
thority...[and]there are cases when the chiefs of OTK, acting
under pressure from the managements of the enterprises, pass
articles that are of bad quality, incompletely assembled, substand-
72 The latest legal definition of the chief accountant's status, rights, and
duties is to be found in the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers dated
Sept. 17, 1947, and the annexed statute (polozhenic); see Bakhchisaraitsev,
op.cit., pp. 500ff.
Cf. Berliner, op.cit., Chapter xiii.
See ibid., pp. 233f., 238-241, and 254.
Quality inspection absorbs a considerable portion of the resources of Soviet
industry. A recent article (S. Kheinman in P.E.G., Oct. 2, 1959, p. 4) states
that "according to the latest occupational census conducted by TsS[J SSSR, the
industrial enterprises of the former union and union-republic industrial, con-
struction, and transportation ministries alone employ over 500 thousand quality
inspectors, controllers, sorters, and disassemblers (razborshchiki), who draw
about five billion rubles in wages annually." The date of the census is not
known, but apparently it took place before the abolition of most industrial
ministries, i.e. before July 1957. In 1956 the total number of wage earners in
state-owned industry was 15 million.
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ard, or [in other ways] do not meet technical specifications." An-
nexed to the resolution were model standard statutes (tipovye
polozheniia) on the structure, rights, and duties of the OTK in dif-
ferent branches of industry, which, inter alia, stipulated that chiefs
of the OTK are to be appointed and dismissed by agencies superior
to the enterprise; that rewards and punishments are to be dispensed
to them by the minister (i.e. not by the director of the enterprise);
reaffirmed that OTK chiefs are subject to the provisions of the edict
of 1940 on quality of output; gave them authority to stop the pro-
duction or delivery of products that do not meet requisite stand-
ards; and provided that a director can overrule this authority only
if he immediately and in writing notifies the chief of the correspond-
ing glavk and the head of the ministry's Chief Quality Inspec-
torate.75 There is no evidence on which to judge the effect of the
resolution of 1952 on the authority and effectiveness of the OTK. It
is, however, quite clear from the Soviet literature that the ineffec-
tiveness of the quality inspectors has not been entirely eliminated.76
The storekeepers and warehouse superintendents, being finan-
cially responsible for the integrity of the inventories in their charge,
might seem to present more effective checks to write-ups by man-
agement, since write-ups, might appear as shortages in the finished
goods inventory. We have aiready noted that some Soviet sources
regard the warehouseman as an effective obstacle to write-ups
(though to write-ups by workers rather than by management in the
examples cited)However,the total picture given by the Soviet
literature is quite different. The continual references to shortages of
finished goods inventory in Soviet auditing manuals,78 in the organ
Direktivy KPSS, Vol. m, pp. 642ff.Thesource reproduces four such
"model statutes," numbered Annexes 2 through 5, and together covering
nearly all of industry with the exception of the specialized branches producing
military and related articles. It seems likely that the unpublished Annex No. 1
refers to these branches.
78 To pick two recent items at random: An author discussing problems of
quality control in the tractor industry considered the OTK unreliable in this
respect (Avtomobil'naia i traktornaia prom yshlennost', 1955, No. 7, P. 1). In
the Sestroretsk tool plant in Leningrad "it happens that a quality inspector
rejects a lot in the middle of the month, but surprisingly by the end of the
month [i.e. at output reporting time—G.G.] the articles turn out to be 'O.K.'
and are delivered to the warehouse as above-standard products" (P.E.C., Dec.
11, 1957, p. 3).
77 See the section on write-ups by the worker.
78 Cf., such books as Alenchikov, op.cit.; N. A. Sokolov, Kom-
pleksnqe dokumentat'nye revizii na zheleznodorozhnom transporte [Compre-
hensive Documents Audits on Railroads], Moscow, 1955; German, op.cit.; and
Ermolaev, op.cit.
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of the Procuracy Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost' [Socialist Legality]
(especially after the edict of June 4, 1947, on "criminal responsi-
bility for the theft of state and public property"), and in books
dealing with the enforcement of the legislation against theft79—all
leave little doubt in the reader's mind that such inventory shortages
are a prevalent phenomenon in Soviet enterprises. Some shortages,
such as those of bulk commodities stored in the open, are difficult
to detect by the very nature of the goods; others are concealed by
the (at times perhaps intentional) disorder in the warehouse; still
others are concealed by more ingenious techniques.8° Of course, not
all inventory shortages are the result of write-ups; some, or even
most, may be due to ordinary pilferage or theft. But if shortages can
be concealed, write-ups of output are invited.
2. CONTROL BY ADMINISTRATIVE StJPERIORS8'
The relationship of the enterprise to its administrative superiors
has been investigated by Berliner, with special reference to the un-
E.g. T. L. Sergeeva, Ugolovno-pravovaia okhrana sobs-
t,ennosti v SSSR [Protection of Socialist Property in Soviet Criminal Law],
Moscow, 1954, passim; and B. S. Utevskii and Z. A. Vyshinskaia, Praktika
primeneniia zakonodatel'stva po bor'be s khishcheniiami sotsialisticheskogo
irnushchestva [The Experience with the Application of Laws Against the Theft
of Socialist Property], Moscow, 1954, passim.
80Thefollowing example of an ingenious technique, though referring to
materials rather than to finished products, is given by a textbook on auditing
(Alenchikov, op.cit., p. 76): "There have been cases where systematic theft
of materials from storerooms was covered up for a long time by the filing of
knowingly groundless claims against suppliers for shortages allegedly dis-
covered at the time of delivery. Such false claims having been rejected by the
suppliers, they were then submitted for litigation, the court, of course, denying
the plaintiffs' suits. In this fashion the stolen assets were written off legally
as bad debts whose collection was denied by the court."
81Theexact structure of the economic administrative hierarchy varies from
branch to branch, place to place, and time to time. By administrative superiors
of the enterprise I mean, of course, such entities as the "trust" (trest), the
"chief administration" (glavk), arid the ministry, and (since mid-1957) the
regional "council of the economy" (sovnarkhoz) and its branch administrations
(otraslevye upravleniia). For the pre-1957 structure of the economic adminis-
trative stmcture in industry, see A. Arakelian, Industrial Management in the
USSR (translation of Upravienie sotsialisticheskoi prom yshlennosti, Moscow,
1947), Washington, 1950, Chapter 4; A. F. Rumiantsev, Organizatsiia uprav-
lenüa promyshlennost'iu SSSR [Structure of Management of Soviet Industry],
Moscow, 1953, pp. 26f.; Granick, op.cit., Chapter ii; and Ekonomika promysh-
lennosti SSSR [The Economics of Soviet Industryl, Moscow, 1956, Chapter 2.
For the structure since mid-1957, see A. N. Efimov, Perestroika upravleniia
prom yshlennost'iu i stroitel'stvom v SSSR [Reorganization of Administration of
Industry and Construction in the USSR], Moscow, 1957, Chapter 3.
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lawful and informal activities of the management.82 I have nothing
to add to hiscarefulstudy. The essence of his findings is that the
ministries (and other higher-level entities—and, one may suppose,
since 1957 also the sovnarkhozy and their departments) are judged
by the success of their subordinate enterprises; that therefore the
interests of the superior entity largely coincide with those of the
enterprise (except in some instances, e.g. where the interests of two
subordinate enterprises are in conflict); that the "web of mutual
involvement" often extends above the enterprise; and that therefore
the superior agencies will overlook simulation and other illicit acts
by management, and at times will perhaps even actively support
such acts. That is to say, the enterprise's administrative superiors
do not, by and large, offer effective checks to distortion of output
data on the enterprise level, at least as long as the distortion remains
within "reasonable" or "acceptable" bounds. This is not to say that
the manager may not try to deceive his administrative superiors in
the economic hierarchy in order to obtain a "safety factor" or for
other compelling reasons, and they may in turn react by exercising
their
There is little reason to suppose that the relations between the
enterprise and the higher economic administrative levels have
changed radically as a result of the supercession of ministries by
sovnarkhozy in the middle of 1957. This reform has not, as yet,
entailed any radical changes in the system of planning, or in the
structure of success criteria and of the corresponding incentives. Nor
has the sellers' market been done away with. There is every reason
to believe, therefore, that the old principles and patterns of behavior
of the manager—and of his superiors—have survived the reorgan-
ization of industrial administration. Indeed, it is possible to argue
that, ceteri3panbus, the sovnarkhozy are more prepared to tolerate
distortion in the reporting of output than were the ministries. As we
have seen, this toleration arises from an identity of interests and is
reinforced by a "web of mutual involvement." Might not the re-
gional economic councils, and the branch administrations under
them, identify their interests with those of the individual enter-
prises, and contrapose them to the interests of "Moscow," even more
than did the far-off glavki and ministries? Might there not be
greater opportunity for close personal ties between the manager and
his administrative superiors under the regional arrangement? To
82Berliner,op.cit.,Chapterxiv,pp. 165,283f., and 324.
83Cf.ibid., pp. 257f.
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further the now institutionalized "localistic" interests, might there
not be even greater unlawful diversion of materials and products,
with corresponding statistical manipulation, than before?
Although the local Party and Soviet (i.e. governmental) officials
are not formally the administrative superiors of the enterprise,84
they can be regarded as such for present purposes. De facto, local
Party and Soviet officials wield some (often great) power over the
enterprise and are responsible to their superiors for plan fulfillment
within their territorial jurisdiction. (The creation of the sovnar-
khozy has probably augmented the de facto authority and responsi-
bility of these officials.) Therefore their interests tend to coincide
with those of the enterprise (and now also with those of the soy-
narkhozy),and they can be expected to take the same attitude
toward simulation by the enterprises in their charge as is taken by
the economic administrative superior agencies.85
3. CONTROL BY OUTSIDE AUTHORITIES
It would seem at first glance that the multiplicity of controlling
and auditing agencies (beside those discussed in the preceding sec-
tion),86 the severity of the punitive measures at their disposal, and
the thoroughness of the police system would successfully thwart the
commission of such "economic crimes" as the falsffication of output
data and related illegal acts. Yet even the least acquaintance with
Soviet reality leads one to the conclusion that "economic crimes" are
extremely prevalent and to the conjecture that for each case that
reaches the daylight of publicity there must be many that never do.
An important factor is, of course, the inherent advantage that any
insider has in concealing irregularities from the outside auditor's
view—what in its more extreme form might be called Pooh-B ah's
Law87—aided by the complexities of the very paper work that is
intended to entrap the culprit, and abetted by the inspector's
corruptibility and his reluctance to stir up a possible hornet's nest.88
84 Except in the common case where the enterprise is part of "local indus-
try," i.e. administratively subordinated to the local soviet.
Cf. Berliner, op.cit., Chapter xv. See also the role of the local Party author-
ities in the creamery case (footnote 85, this chapter).
88 For example, the State Bank, the Ministry of Finance, the statistical ap-
paratus, the trade union, the political police, the ordinary police, the Ministry
of State Control.
87 "•.
.asPaymaster-General, I could so cook the accounts that, as Lord
High Auditor, I should never discover the fraud."
88 It is noteworthy that during the early postwar years, the period for which
S.Z., the organ of the Procuracy, was available to me, reports of successful
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Local Party officials are not unflagging guardians of legality; on
the contraly, they may be closely linked by ties of kinship and
friendship and through the usual web of mutual involvement to
those whom they are supposed to supervise and exhort. Party mem-
bers often hold managerial positions themselves. Moreover, the
greater their authority, the more opportunities there are to turn it
to personal advantage. Thus, despite a specific order from the
Central Committee requiring all Party organizations to uncover
and to bring the culprits to justice forthwith, membership
in the Party does not seem to preclude connivance with, and even
participation in,the distortion of reports and other "economic
Bribery of local Party officials in connection with such
acts has also been
Very little is known about the alertness of the secret police to
false reporting and related crimes, but some information is avail-
able on the role of the Procuracy in this regard. This information
indicates that, at least in some periods, the Procuracy failed to
exercise the expected initiative in supervising the enforcement of
economic legislation and to investigate and prosecute anything like
all the cases of law violation that came to its attention. An internal
order of the Procurator of the USSR, dated February 20, 1936, com-
plained of the "completely unsatisfactory state of supervision" by
agencies of the Procuracy over the enforcement of "statistical disci-
pline," and called for an immediate improvement in this respect.91
A few years later, the journal of the State Arbitration Commission
complained: "There are many instances where agencies of the Proc-
uracy not only fail to exercise initiative in prosecuting individuals
guilty of producing brak, but even fail to react to notices from arbi-
discovery of economic crimes were usually concluded by a statement that the
investigating judge in charge was promoted and awarded two months' salary
for the commendable discharge of his duties. As to corruptibility, my informa-
tion comes orally from, among other sources, a former inspector for the Min-
istry of Finance. On the low quality of audits, see also B.U., 1954, No. 4,
pp. 1-6, and P.E.G., May 15, 1959, p. 3.
89See,for instance, P.Zh., 1955, No. 11, pp. 28-30. Ample confirmation can
a'so be found in the accounts of defectors, e.g. Konstantinovsky, op.cit., P. 18.
Cf. Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 203ff.,
on the relations of local Party officials to economic affairs. For a recent com-
plaint that local Party units defend "localistic" interests, see Pravda, Sept. 1,
1958, p. 2.
90Cf.Konstantinovsky, op.cit., p. 23. For a recent account of bribery of a
local Party official, see Pravda, Aug. 27, 1958, p. 2.
91B.F.Kh.Z.,1936, No. 13, p. 41.
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tration agencies regarding the mandatory prosecution of specific Cul-
prits."92 Konstantinovsky confirms this general picture when he re-
calls that in his experience, i.e. before the war, "the number of cases
[of inventory shortage] in some years was so great that the organs of
the Procuracy and the judicial investigating organs did all they could
to prevent, if possible, any more such cases from reaching the
This situation seems to have persisted despite—or per-
haps because of—the intervening enactment of the harsh 1940 edict
on the production of defective goods, the enforcement of which
was entrusted to the Procuracy. In 1947, an article in the journal of
the Procuracy itself complained that very few such cases were being
initiated by the prosecuting agencies, implying that this was due to
their negligence rather than lack of grist for the juridical mill; and
that such cases as were initiated pertained chiefly to consumer
goods, a relatively less important part of the And lastly we
may note here, as we have already noted in an earlier section of
this chapter, that the 1q52 resolution of the Council of Ministers on
the quality of industrial production explicitly complained of the
failure of the Procuracy to discharge its duties effectively in this
regard.95
The statistical apparatus itself, of course, is charged with check-
ing the quality and truthfulness of the reports submitted to it,
whether by enterprises or by higher entities. The literature of the
thirties contains only occasional statements that such checks were
not adequately conducted, but the postwar literature is replete with
complaints on this score with a definite crescendo from 1949 to
1951.96
While it is conceded that the local statistical offices conduct
92Arbitrazh, 1939, No. 11, p. 3.
93Konstantinovsky,op.cit., p. 17. Granick (op.cit., pp. 190-191) similarly
concludes that "the weapon of criminal prosecution against management has
been used sparingly" except in "national campaigns to show that the State
means business." He notes, moreover, that initiative for criminal prosecution of
management was (in the thirties, at least) "retained by economic organs above
the finns, such as the glavki," and that "... Sovietlegal organs have—in the
field of industry—been geared primarily to acting in the interests of produc-
tion 'success'" (ibid., pp. 199-200).
S.Z., 1947, No. 8, pp. 3f. See also footnote 10, this chapter.
See p. 71.
96 See especially V.S. 1951, No. 2,pp. 91-95, and No. 5, pp. 57-61. In
1949/SO the Party and the government issued directives demanding improve-
ment in this regard; these were followed by an internal order of TsSU (dated
Jan. 26, 1950) and accompanied by a series of special conferences (ibid., No.
2, pp. 92f.).
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numerous audits of enterprises and departments in order to ascer-
tain the truthfulness of reports, these checks are said to be usually
superficial, poorly organized, "formalistic" and routine, and too
brief. The quality of audits suffers in part because too many are
undertaken. (One wonders to what extent the reports of local sta-
tistical offices are themselves "written up" in this regard.) These
structures usually appear in the same context as the exhortations to
the statistical personnel to be honest, to abide by high principles,
etc.
Postwar sources also constantly complain of the "liberal" attitude
evinced by the supervising authorities—be they Party organizations,
government agencies, or statistical agencies—toward the wrong-
Obviously there has been considerable reluctance, probably
combined with clogged dockets, on the part of the various authori-
ties to invoke full legal sanctions, and if action was taken at all, it
was often, though clearly not always, confined to a "cease and
desist" order or a mild reprimand. The relaxation of terror since
1953 may have augmented the feeling on the part of managerial
personnel that "one can get away with things," although it may also
have reduced the necessity to falsify in order to survive economi-
cally. Time may tell whether these conjectures are valid.
4. CHECKS BY TRANSACTOBS
If write-ups, unjustified upgrading, the counting of brak as valid
finished output, and similar practices that overstate the enterprise's
performance are not to leave lasting and incriminating evidence in
the form of discrepancies between internal records and the physical
inventory of finished goods, they must be, so to speak, "shipped
out" of the plant and "passed on" to the enterprise's customers.
That is to say, the invoices and related papers must overstate the
quantity, grade, or quality of the goods shipped. But it would seem
that the transactors—the buyers of the goods and the common
carriers who haul them away—have a clear interest in thwarting
Cf. P.Zh., 1955, No. 11, pp. 28-30 and 80; V.S., 1951, No. 2, pp. 92f.;
No. 5, pp. 55 and 60; 1953, No. 1, p. 23; 1955, No. 6, p. 11. Tsonev (op.cit.,
p. 153) also notes the mildness of the penalties for transgressions of this sort
that have been reported by the press in postwar years, compared with those
meted out in the thirties and during the war. On the other hand, this does not
mean that harsh penalties were also not dispensed after the war for certain
"economic crimes." For instance, the sentences for theft of food mentioned in
S.Z. during 1947 and 1948, years of great food shortage, can be characterized
only as savage.
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anything of this sort, and that they consequently provide a very
important check to write-ups, etc., on the part of producers. That
checks by transactors, especially by buyers, are often more effective
than the three types of checks already discussed is indeed occa-
sionally borne out by the evidence. For example, a Soviet author
recently wrote:98
"It is well known that administrative control, exercised from the
top downward, over the activity of enterprises with regard to
quantitative and qualitative fulfillment of plans by individual com-
modities [po nomenklaturej has never been either effective or
timely without the mutual checking of the seller and the buyer at
the time of delivery of the goods."
Moreover, because of the possibility of cross audits by the various
control agencies, the seller would presumably avoid entering or
declaring on invoices and waybils information that contradicted
his internal records and his statistical and accounting reports.
Consequently there would seem to exist an unbroken chain of
control linking the physical goods with the producer's reports: the
buyer and common carrier, acting to safeguard their own interests,
verify the invoices and waybills against the physical goods they
receive; copies of these documents remain in their files; and, at
any later time, any auditing authority presumably can check these
documents against the seller's (producer's) internal records, sta-
tistical and accounting reports, and finished goods inventory on
hand. Write-ups and similar practices would thus seem to be
precluded.
And yet we already know that some of the links in this chain are
rather weak. Even the link involving transactors, though perhaps
frequently stronger than the others because of self-interest,is
nonetheless far from infallible. Its weakness may derive from three
circumstances: (1) collusion between the producer and the cus-
tomer (or other transactor); (2) domination of the buyer by the
seller due to the prevailing seller's market; and (3) in the case of
the common carrier, negligence abetted by a possible coincidence
98M.Broide, "0 novykh formakh upravienlia v neftianci promyshlennosti"
[On the New Structure of Management in the Petroleum Industry], Sovetskoe
gosudarstvo i pravo, 1957, No. 5, p. 46. The article argued for the retention of
supply organizations after the 1957 reorganization of industry. The
phrase "the mutual checking of the seller and the buyer" obviously stands
euphemistically for "the checking of the seller by the buyer."
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of interests with the shipper. Of the three, collusion may be the
least prevalent, if only because it generally presupposes that the
two (or more) colluding enterprises are each other's regular cus-
tomers. Yet it apparently happens. Consider the following actual
case of a dairy and a plywood factory. The dairy sold casein to
the plywood factory for the manufacture of glue, while the factory
sold plywood to the dairy for boxes to pack the casein (and pos-
sibly other dairy products). By collusion, the two enterprises
wrote up the output of casein and plywood, respectively; illegally
diverted some of the raw materials; and "shipped out" the fictitious
portions of output to each other with the aid of false invoices.99
As we have just seen, an alternative to "piling up" the written
up portion of output—be it brak or completely nonexistent prod-
ucts—in one's own warehouse is to "ship it out" to one's customers.
This alternative has the advantage of removing the evidence of
irregularities (brak or shortages) from the producer's premises, but
has the obvious drawback that it runs counter to the interests of
the customer. At first glance, it would therefore seem, by and large,
impossible to cover up the overstated portion of output by "ship-
ping it out." But the Soviet literature leaves no doubt that this is
done on a substantial scale; certainly with brak, but also occa-
sionally with never-produced output. The explanation of this para-
dox lies in the specific characteristics of the Soviet economic scene,
and particularly of the chronic sellers' market. It does not seem to
make any substantial difference in this respect whether the product
is under centralized allocation ("funded") or not.
The persistent and sometimes severe excess of demand over
supply (at the stated price) frequently causes buyers to overlook
deviations from quality specifications and •to accept substandard
products, to accede to tie-in sales, and occasionally even to wink
at shortage in quantity. Buyers tend to "take what they can get"
and are reluctant to remonstrate with suppliers or to invoke legal
measures for fear of spoiling relations with them. For instance, a
1937 article in Arbitrazh,b00 the journal of the State Arbitration
Commission, complained that few cases about the quality of sup-
plies were initiated by buyers before that body and explained this
fact in approximately the terms given above; while a more recent
source inveighed against "the rotten practice [among enterprises]
Thiscase was related to me from personal recollection by Professor Ecigars
Dunsdorfs of the University of Melbourne, formerly of Riga, Latvia.
No.15, pp. 3-5.
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of granting 'mutual forgiveness' for nonadherence to conditions of
delivery."bol The same isimplicit in the endless complaints of
buyers, of producer as well as of consumer goods, which have been
filling the Soviet press almost daily since the beginning of the Plan
era. Only do these complaints give any reason to
believe that the goods were returned to the seller (producer) for
being defective in quality or short in quantity.102
The common practice of suppliers to hold up delivery until late
in the accounting period, when buyers are most desperate to meet
their plan targets and are therefore more vulnerable to the supplier's
pressures, probably facilitates the shipping out of brak and fictitious
output. Another contributing factor seems to be the poor organiza-
tion of the receiving department in many enterprises, mentioned
in postwar as well as prewar sources.103
This is not to say that some defective goods are not returned to
the producer. Thus, the text of the 1952 resolution of the Council
of Ministers on the quality of industrial output, akeady mentioned
more than once above, states that in 1951 representatives of the
USSR Ministry of Agriculture returned to the plants of the Ministry
of Agricultural Machine-Building for elimination of defects 11.2
per cent of the agricultural machines delivered to the former;
while the customers of the tractor plants of the Ministry of the
101 P.Kh., 1956, No. 1, p. 65; cf. Finansy SSSR, 1955, No. 7, p. 43.
102 On the quality of output, see also pp. 70ff. For a fuller discussion of the
shipment of brak to customers and of the weakness of their resistance to this
practice, see Berliner, op.cit., pp. 149ff., 239, and 254. It is clear from the
literature that the practice persists and that buyers still have little choice but
to take what they are given. For a couple of striking illustrations, drawn vir-
tually at random from the recent literature, and both incidentally referring to
high-priority articles (diesel locomotives and heavy mechanical presses), see
P.E.C., Sept. 18, 1957, p. 2, and Dec. 11, 1957, p. 3.
An illuniinating recent article on the quality of construction contains a brief
but pointed discussion of the low quality of building materials and makes it
quite clear, if not explicit, that construction organizations can do little but
accept defective materials (Paraubek, op.cit., pp. 374-377). The author states,
for instance, that "at the present time" as much as 60 per cent of the brick
does not correspond to standard specifications, some of it deviating [down-
ward?] as much as 2.5 cm from the standard, and that the actual grade of
brick reaching the construction site frequently is below that indicated in the
corresponding invoice (pasport). Compare the following statement, also per-
taining to the construction industry; "The shortage of materials, parts, com-
ponents, plumbing supplies, etc., leads to the situation that the contract and
the obligations stipulated by it lose their force. Sanctions are not applied. The
builders use any supplies that are delivered to them, filing no claims on account
of their quality, times of delivery, completeness of assembly, grade of product,
and the like" (V.E., 1957, No. 4, p. 82).
103 Cf. Z.I., June 11, 1937,p. 2; and Alenchikov, op.cit., pp. 10Sf.
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Automotive and Tractor Industry returned 22 per cent of the
tractors delivered to them.b04 However, we are not told what effect,
if any, this had on the production reports submitted by the agri-
cultural machinery and tractor plants, nor do we know whether the
items returned account for all the defective products of these
plants in the year in question. (We may doubt the latter consider-
ing the frequent complaints about the quality of the machines as
they arrive in the countryside.) In general, the ability of a producer
to "ship out" the written up portion of output (by cheating on
quantity, or unjustified upgrading, or delivering brak) and to get
away with it would seem, to a large extent, to depend on the
countervailing power, including the political "pull" and the priority
ranking, possessed by the customer. The shoddiness of Soviet con-
sumer goods and the poor quality of building materials, on the
one hand, and the excellence of many military articles, on the
other, amply illustrate this point.'05
When the quantity of the shipment is overstated, the shipper
must face, in addition to the checks imposed by the buyer, the
possibility of checks by the common carrier, which is usually the
railroad. Since the carrier is responsible for the safe delivery of the
goods, it might be expected to make sure that the accompanying
documents do not overstate the size of the shipment. But in reality
it seems to be rather negligent in this respect, and furthermore its
interests seem to be more equivocal. The railroad has its freight
loading and freight haulage plans, revenue and unit cost targets,
and various other "qualitative norms" to meet and overfuffill. It
may thus be quite willing to overlook the shippers' overstatement
of We may also note that loading gangs are apparently
paid on a piece-work and may therefore welcome and abet
write-ups of the weight of shipment. These impressions are cor-
roborated by Professor Williams' study of Soviet transportation
statistics.'°8
104DirektivyKPSS, vol. u, p. 642. The text is careful to stress that in both
cases the articles had been passed by the OTK.
105Cf.Berliner, op.cit., p. 152.
106Attimes the carrier may write up the weight liberally himself; in some
trucking firms in Leningrad such write-ups are said to have been as high as
300 to 400 per cent (Finansy SSSR, 1955, No. 7, p. 43).
107Sokolov,op.cit., pp. 13 and 131.
108"Soviettons originated are clearly overstated as a result of showing on
freight waybills more tonnage than is actually loaded in cars, although we
cannot say by how much" (Ernest W. Williams, "Soviet Transportation De-
velopment: A Comparison with the U.S.," American Economic Review, May
1958, p. 414).
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The waybill of a Soviet railroad contains spaces to enter the
weight of the shipment as determined by both the shipper and
the railroad.b09 However, the raikoad's representative does not al-
ways weigh the freight. Rather, the rule is that he weighs the
freight only when it is loaded from the railroad's warehouse or
at a station. When the freight is shipped from a plant's siding,
or its own warehouse, or other "loading points not in common
[open] use," the weighing is done by the shipper.110 It would seem
that the latter is the typical situation with Soviet industrial plants
of any substantial size. This may amount to a significant loophole
for the overstating of the quantity of goods shipped.
It seems, therefore, that the carrier does not present an insur-
mountable barrier to the "shipping out" of the written up portion
of output.
To conclude this chapter, it has been demonstrated that the
Soviet enterprise is a major source of distortion in Soviet industrial
output statistics. More often than not the result is overstatement of
output (this concept, of course, being understood in a manifold
way, including quality standards and other considerations). But in
some respects the actions of the enterprise (and of self-serving
individuals within it) may cause understatement of output. I shall
gather the various strands of the argument in the last chapter.
We may also note in passing that the data on mileage and ton-mileage in
trucking may be considerably exaggerated because drivers are remunerated by
the mile or ton-mile. Manipulation of speedometers, dumping of gasoline
(when its apparent consumption is taken as evidence of the distance traveled),
and writing up of the tonnage carried seem to take place on a large scale. See,
for example, Pravda, June 5, 1959, p. 4, and Voprosy stroitel'stva kommunizma
v SSSR [Problems of the Building of Communism in the USSR], Moscow, 1959,
p. 352.
109V. Kochetov, Zheleznodorozhnaia [Railroad Statistics], Mos-
cow, 1953, Annex 1.
110Article72 of the Railroad Charter, as cited by V. N. Izvolenskii,
voprosy zheleznodorozhnykh perevozok [Legal Aspects of Railroad Haulage],
Moscow, 1955, p. 61. Cf. A. M. Beliakova, "Voprosy otvetstvennosti zheleznykh
dorog p0 dogovoru perevozki gruzov v praktike Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR"
[Responsibility of Railroads with Regard to Freight Haulage Contracts as In-
terpreted by the USSR Supreme Court] in Uchenye zapiski [Learned Notes],
Issue 168, Book 7, Moscow, 1954, P. 43. A recent article describing illegal
trade in scrap metal states that "the railroad makes out formal papers [kom-
mercheskie akty] by weighing only every tenth car and accepting the shipper's
documents' for the rest," and adds: "What brilliant prospects for dishonest
people" (P.E.G., Jan. 8, 1958, 3).
99